



Abstract—Shared  understanding  is  commonly  seen  as 
essential to the success of coalition operations, and current 
research efforts are attempting to develop techniques and 
technologies to improve shared understanding in coalition 
military contexts. In spite of this, our understanding of what  
the  term  ‘shared  understanding’  actually  means  is 
surprisingly poor. In part, this problem is attributable to the 
difficulty  in  comprehending  the  true  nature  of 
understanding itself, although confusion also arises about 
the  precise  nature  of  the  differences  between  shared 
understanding  and  ostensibly  similar  constructs,  such  as 
shared mental models and shared situation awareness. This 
paper  discusses  a  number  of  issues  associated  with 
understanding and shared understanding. The paper begins 
with  an  attempt  to  identify  what  the  notions  of 
understanding  and  shared  understanding  might  mean.  It 
then  attempts  to  distinguish  understanding  and  shared 
understanding  from  ostensibly  similar  constructs,  such  as 
shared situation awareness, shared mental models and team 
sensemaking. Subsequent sections of the paper discuss the 
potential  importance  of  shared  understanding  to  military 
coalitions,  approaches  to  measuring  and  representing 
shared  understanding,  and  future  research  to  further  our 
understanding  of  the  factors  that  influence  shared 
understanding in military coalition contexts. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Shared understanding is a construct of apparent importance 
in  military  coalition  operations.  This  is  evidenced  by 
anecdotal  reports  suggesting  that  shared  understanding 
enables coalition forces to coordinate their efforts in respect 
of  mission  goals.  Furthermore,  major  coalition-oriented 
research programmes, such as the International Technology 
Alliance  (ITA), have identified shared understanding as a 
hard  problem  for  future  coalition  operations,  and 
considerable research effort is now being invested into the 
development  of  techniques  and  technologies  to  support 
improvements in shared understanding. In spite of all this, 
the  notion  of  shared  understanding  is  something  that  is 
surprisingly hard to understand. The notion is clearly related 
to individual  forms of understanding, but there is no real 
consensus about what the true nature of individual forms of 
understanding  might  be.  Clearly,  if  we  are  to  undertake 
research exploring the notion of shared understanding, then 
it is important that we attempt to arrive at a clear definition 
of  what  the  term  ‗shared  understanding‘  actually  means. 
Furthermore, we need to be clear about the precise inter-
relationships between shared understanding and ostensibly 
similar  notions  such  as  shared  situation  awareness  (SSA) 
and shared mental models (SMMs). In the absence of this 
kind of clarification, there is a danger that research efforts 
may be duplicated, or the relevance of particular research 
outcomes may be overlooked.  
This  paper  discusses  a  number  of  issues  associated  with 
understanding and shared understanding. The paper begins 
with  an  attempt  to  identify  what  the  notions  of 
understanding and shared understanding might mean. It then 
attempts  to  distinguish  understanding  and  shared 
understanding  from  ostensibly  similar  constructs,  such  as 
shared situation awareness, shared mental models and team 
sensemaking. Subsequent sections of the paper discuss the 
potential  importance  of  shared  understanding  to  military 
coalitions, approaches to measuring and representing shared 
understanding,  and  future  research  to  further  our 
understanding  of  the  factors  that  influence  shared 
understanding in military coalition contexts. 
2. UNDERSTANDING UNDERSTANDING 
In order to explore the notion of shared understanding it is 
first important that we understand what is meant by the term 
‗understanding‘. Unfortunately, as is evidenced by previous 
philosophical  discussions  on  the  topic,  the  task  of 
understanding  understanding  is  not  one  to  be  undertaken 
lightly (Rosenberg, 1981). Indeed, in the first chapter of his 
book,  entitled  Understanding  Understanding,  Paul  Ziff 
(1972)  arrives  at  the  rather  dismal  conclusion  ―that  to 
understand understanding is a task to be attempted and not 
to  be  achieved  today,  or  even  tomorrow‖  (pg.  20).  How, 
then,  might  we  best  make  steps  towards  understanding 
understanding? In this section we pursue three approaches. 
The  first  approach  is  to  review  existing  attempts  to 
understand  understanding.  In  this  case,  perhaps  the  most 
notable contribution to the philosophical debate surrounding 
the  notion  of  ‗understanding‘  derives  from  the  work  of 
Ludwig  Wittgenstein,  particularly  his  work  in  the 
Philosophical Investigations (Wittgenstein, 1967)
1. Another 
approach that we purs ue in this section is to look at the 
various contexts in which the not ion of understanding is 
commonly used. Understanding thus emerges in discussions 
of how we make sense of various things , such as sensory 
stimuli,  intentional  actions,  words  and  sentences,  and 
situations. By examining the use of the term ‗understanding‘ 
                                                            
1 Clearly, there have been many attempts to understand understanding 
other  than  those  of  Wittgenstein.  Føllesdal  (1981),  for  example,  sees 
understanding as a kind of knowledge. For reasons of space we refrain 
from a more complete survey of the relevant philosophical, psychological 
and linguistic literatures.  
Understanding and Shared Understanding in Military 
Coalitions 
Paul R. Smart 




in these various contexts, we may perhaps arrive at a better 
understanding  of  what  understanding  actually  means. 
Finally,  we  attempt  to  consider  what  it  is  that  makes 
understanding so difficult to understand. We recognize that 
some things are more difficult to understand than others. As 
such, if we consider what it is that makes certain things hard 
to  understand,  then  perhaps  we  will  arrive  at  a  better 
understanding of the thing that is perhaps the most difficult 
to understand: understanding itself. 
2.1. Wittgenstein and Understanding 
Perhaps the best starting point in our effort to understand 
understanding  is  to  consider  previous  attempts  to  make 
sense  of  the  notion.  In  this  respect,  the  work  of  Ludwig 
Wittgenstein,  particularly  his  work  in  the  Philosophical 
Investigations, is a major focus of attention. Understanding 
is  one  of  the  central  themes  of  the  Philosophical 
Investigations,  and  throughout  sections  143-242 
Wittgenstein attempts to analyse the relationships between 
understanding  and  categories  such  as  states,  processes, 
events and abilities. The culmination of this analysis is the 
claim that understanding is something akin to an ability. To 
understand, claims Wittgenstein, is to be able to do certain 
things. Thus, to understand a sentence is to be able to do 
things that involve the sentence, e.g., to apply it correctly, to 
paraphrase  it  and  to  respond  to  it  in  appropriate  ways. 
Similarly, to understand a word is, inter alia, to be able to 
use it correctly. 
By casting understanding as a kind of ability, Wittgenstein 
hopes to avoid a number of confusions and pitfalls regarding 
a philosophical grasp of understanding. In particular, he is 
keen to resolve a number of categorization errors that may 
result from a reflection on the nature of understanding. One 
such category error is the notion that understanding is a kind 
of experience: the kind of experience we have when we feel 
we  understanding  something,  or  when  we  suddenly  gain 
insight  into  some  previously  ill-understood  phenomenon. 
Although  tempting,  this  view  of  understanding  is 
misconceived. It is misconceived for a number of reasons, 
not  least  because  we  may  feel  we  understand  something 
even  though  we  do  not.  In  addition,  a  description  of  the 
various experiences that accompany understanding does not 
seem to capture the true essence of understanding. A person 
may  have  many  experiences  when  they  understand 
something, and none of these seems sufficient (or indeed 
necessary) for our ascription of understanding – we do not 
say  that  someone  understands  something  in  virtue  of  the 
kind of experiences that they are subject to. 
In addition to discounting the idea that understanding is an 
experience,  Wittgenstein  also  rejects  the  idea  that 
understanding is a  mental  state or a  mental process
2 (see 
Baker  &  Hacker,  1980  for  further  discussion) . 
Understanding is not a mental   state, Wittgenstein argues, 
                                                            
2 As we will see in Section 4.2, this conclusion perhaps enables us to 
resolve  a  particular  point  of  contention  in  discussions  about  situation 
awareness: the apparent duality of situation awareness as both a state and a 
process (see Rousseau et al., 2004). 
because it does not have the properties of a mental state. A 
mental state has what is called ‗genuine duration‘. Thus, one 
can be in a state of anxiety for 5 minutes or more, but it does 
not make sense to talk of being in a state of understanding 
for a specific period of time. If one lost consciousness, then 
one would no longer be in a state of anxiety; however, one‘s 
understanding  of  something,  say  English,  would  not  be 
similarly curtailed.  
Wittgenstein  also  rejects  the  idea  that  understanding  is  a 
mental  process.  A  mental  process  can  be  interrupted; 
however,  understanding  does  not  seem  to  be  similarly 
interruptible. An interruption of understanding is a failure of 
understanding, or a breakdown in understanding; it is not 
some sort of hiatus in understanding. Also, we do not go 
looking for mental processes when we attempt to ascertain 
whether  someone  understands  something.  A  person‘s 
understanding  of  this  paper  is  not  based  on  the  mental 
processes he or she has. It is rather based on the possession 
of certain abilities: an ability to ask questions about it, to 
recount it, to conclude that it is thoughtful and insightful, or 
to come to some other conclusion(!). 
2.2. Varieties of Understanding 
One of the things that may complicate an understanding of 
understanding  is  that  the  term  ‗understanding‘  is  used  in 
many different contexts. In addition to this, the objects of 
understanding – the things that are actually understood – are 
highly  disparate  and  diverse.  Although  there  have  been 
some  attempts  to  identify  the  common  characteristics  of 
things that are the legitimate targets of understanding (Ziff, 
1972), it is by no means clear that the various things we can 
understand  do,  in  fact,  constitute  a  unified  category.  In 
addition, as mentioned in Smart et al (2009b), it is unclear 
whether  the  notion  of  understanding  that  is  used  in  the 
context of language understanding is the same as that used 
in  the  context  of  understanding  intentional  action  or  in 
understanding    particular  situations.  By  looking  at  the 
various ways in which the notion of understanding is used in 
different  contexts,  we  may  be  able  to  ascertain  whether 
understanding  can  be  treated  as  a  unitary  concept  and, 
moreover, determine what are its essential properties. 
Sensory Sense-Making 
One context in which the notion of understanding has been 
used  is  in  philosophical  and  psychological  discussions  of 
perception. Perception, it has been argued, depends on more 
than just an ability to detect stimuli; it also depends on an 
ability to make sense of them – to understand them. Support 
for such a view derives from the various cases of cataract 
surgery that have been undertaken with congenitally blind 
individuals.  Although  such  surgical  interventions  were 
intended to restore the sight of patients, their success was 
limited  to  the  restoration  of  something  more  limited:  an 
ability to merely sense visual stimuli but not perceive them 
(Valvo,  1971).  Sensation  is  not  the  same  as  seeing,  it  is 
argued, because seeing requires an ability to make sense of 
visual  stimuli,  to  appreciate  their  significance  and 
implications for future action. ―To see‖, writes Noë (2004),  
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―one  must  have visual impressions that one  understands‖ 
(pg. 6) [original emphasis]. 
If perception is predicated on some form of understanding, 
in what might that understanding consist? According to one 
increasingly popular theory, the content and character of our 
perceptual  experience  derives  from  our  (implicit) 
knowledge of what are called ‗sensorimotor dependencies‘ 
(i.e. our knowledge of the relations between movement or 
change  and  the  resulting  patterns  of  sensory  stimulation) 
(Noë, 2004; O'Regan & Noë, 2001). To perceive, on this 
view,  is  to  be  in  possession  of  a  body  of  (largely  non-
conscious) knowledge concerning the way in which patterns 
of sensory stimuli will change as a function of behaviour. In 
order to have the kind of phenomenal experiences we do 
(the sights, sounds, feelings, or whatever), we need to learn 
about  the  predictive  relationships  concerning  the  way  in 
which  our  own  behaviour  affects  sensory  inputs.  To 
understand, on this view, is to be in command of a kind of 
predictive  ability,  an  ability  to  appreciate  the  sensory 
consequences of motor action and to coordinate behavioural 
output accordingly. Such a view has much to commend it in 
terms of what we know about the functional operation of 
certain brain circuits
3. It also aligns itself pretty closely with 
Wittgenstein‘s notion of understanding as something akin to 
an ability – the ability in this case is to predict or anticipate 
the sensory consequences of movement or change. 
Understanding Intentional Actions 
Another  context  in  which  the  notion  of  understanding  is 
used is in the understanding of intentional action. In order to 
make sense of one another‘s actions, we seem to rely on a 
folk-theoretic  framework  that  emphasizes  the  causal 
relevance of certain mental states and processes. Thus, in 
order to make sense of a person‘s actions, we say that they 
must have certain beliefs and desires, and that those beliefs 
and  desires  are  causally-relevant  to  the  actions  that  we 
observe.  Understanding,  on  this  view,  seems  to  take  the 
form  of  an  ability  to  account  for,  or  explain,  a  person‘s 
actions with respect to a particular theoretical framework. 
We might also be inclined to say that a person understands 
someone‘s  actions  if  they  are  additionally  able  to  predict 
what someone will do in light of the possession of certain 
mental states.  
One way in which we may be able to understand the actions 
of other agents is by a process of mental simulation; i.e., 
mentally simulating the observed actions in order to infer 
what we ourselves would need to think and feel in order to 
express  the  same  action  in  the  same  context.  This 
simulation-based view has much in common with the views 
of the German sociologist, Max Weber. Weber advocated an 
approach to understanding human action that is grounded in 
the notion of verstehen (German for ‗understanding‘). This 
                                                            
3  Many  neural  circuits  in  the  brain  seem  to  be  involved  in  the 
computation (and minimization) of prediction error signals; i.e. signals that 
represent the error between a predicted pattern of activity and the actual 
activity generated as a result of internal or external events (Schultz et al., 
1997; Schultz & Dickinson, 2000).  
approach emphasizes the importance of putting oneself in 
the mind of others, of trying to understand human action by 
knowing what in oneself would need to be the case in order 
for the action to be expressed. Recently, of course, a rich 
theoretical and empirical literature has emerged regarding 
the  role  of  so-called  ‗mirror  neurons‘  in  our  ability  to 
understand (to make sense of) the actions of others (Gallese 
&  Goldman,  1998;  Rizzolatti  &  Craighero,  2004).  Such 
mechanisms may be relevant to understanding in a variety 
of  contexts,  most  notably  our  understanding  of  linguistic 
utterances.  One,  admittedly  speculative,  proposal  is  that 
mental  simulation  processes  could  be  used  to  support  an 
understanding of the pragmatics of spoken language. The 
general idea is that in order to understand why a particular 
speech  act  was  performed,  one  might  mentally  simulate 
what was said in a given context in order to determine the 
kind of mental states (e.g. intentions) that would lead to the 
overt expression of that act. In support of this claim, there is 
some  evidence  that  our  perception  of  speech  sounds 
involves the activation of those motor programs that would 
be used to produce the same sounds if we ourselves were to 
make those sounds (Porter & Lubker, 1980).  
Language Understanding 
The topic of language understanding is a vast and complex 
topic,  and  it  is  impossible  to  do  justice  to  the  various 
theoretical and empirical contributions in the current paper. 
Wittgenstein‘s views have been very influential in guiding 
the philosophical debate over language understanding, and, 
as  mentioned  in  Section  2.1,  Wittgenstein  sees  language 
understanding, and perhaps all forms of understanding, as 
akin to the possession of an ability, power or capacity. For 
Wittgenstein, understanding a language is a matter of being 
able  to  do  things  (many  different  things),  and  these 
performances underwrite the ascription of understanding – 
they are criteria against which we judge whether someone 
understands (or does not understand) a particular linguistic 
expression.  
Going  beyond  the  philosophical  debates,  most  of  the 
empirical  work  that  has  been  undertaken  in  this  area  has 
focused on an elucidation of the cognitive processes that are 
involved  in  both  language  comprehension  and  language 
production. Influential work in this area includes Kintsch‘s 
(1988,  1998)  construction-integration  model  for  discourse 
comprehension. The model involves the construction of an 
initial set of propositional representations (representing the 
meaning of one or more sentences), followed by a process 
of    propositional  elaboration  and  then  refinement  and 
integration.  The  end  result  of  these  elaboration  and 
integration  processes  is  a  situation  representation,  or  a 
mental  model,  describing  the  situation  referred  to  by  the 
original sentences.  
An alternative view of language comprehension is provided 
by perceptual-simulation theory (Zwaan & Kaschak, 2009; 
Zwaan & Taylor, 2006). This theory claims that language 
understanding  involves  the  perceptual  simulation  of  the 





The  notion  of  situational  understanding  is  something  that 
seems  very  similar  to  the  notion  of  situation  awareness 
(SA).  Situational  understanding  involves  an  ability  to 
explain how the current situation, or elements thereof, came 
to be as they are, and it often involves an additional ability 
to predict how the current situation may develop or evolve 
in the future. Situational understanding therefore seems to 
be  based  on  the  possession  of  certain  predictive  and 
explanatory  abilities,  abilities  that  seem  to  be  based  on 
knowledge about the kind of causal relationships that exist 
between  various  situation  elements.  Crucially,  situation 
understanding seems to be based on an ability to infer the 
existence of unseen, or unobserved, elements of the current 
situation.  Thus,  explanation  and  prediction  rely  on 
retrodictive and predictive inferences about states-of-affairs 
that are not currently accessible to an observer. This ability 
to  ‗see  more  than  meets  the  eye‘  may  be  a  common 
characteristic of many forms of understanding. In the case 
of  sensory  sense-making,  for  example,  we  spoke  of  an 
ability to predict the sensory consequences of movement; in 
the case of understanding intentional actions we spoke of an 
ability  to  infer  the  existence  of  causally-relevant  mental 
states; and in the case of language comprehension we spoke 
of  a  collection  of  abilities  that  could  be  construed  as 
dependent on a capacity to ‗see beyond the symbol‘ (i.e. to 
infer  the  semantic  referents  of  particular  linguistic 
expressions). 
2.3. Why is Understanding Understanding Difficult? 
As  mentioned  in  the  introduction  to  this  section, 
understanding  is  commonly  seen  as  something  that  is 
difficult to understand. Why might this be so, and can we 
learn  anything  about  the  nature  of  understanding  by 
considering why understanding is so difficult to understand? 
According  to  Ziff  (1972),  understanding  is  essentially  an 
analytical  process  whose  difficulty  is  related  to  the 
structural  complexity  of  the  object  to  be  understood. 
Rosenberg  (1981)  extends  this  analysis  by  including  two 
additional  factors  that  may  make  something  difficult  to 
understand.  One  is  the  need  to  put  an  object  of 
understanding  in  its  proper  context,  of  establishing  a 
network of relationships between the thing to be understood 
and other elements of the surrounding context. Rosenberg 
(1981) argues that this is not a process of analysis, as Ziff 
(1972) seems to suggest; it is more a case of synthesis, of 
―bringing things into relation, of building up a network of 
connections, interdependencies and affinities‖ (Rosenberg, 
1981;  pg.  33).  An  ambiguous  sentence  or  word  is  thus 
disambiguated  by  establishing  relationships  between  the 
sentence  or  the  word  and  a  number  of  surrounding 
contextual elements.  
The second additional factor that Rosenberg (1981) claims 
is  a  contributing  factor  to  the  difficulty  in  understanding 
something, is the vagueness or indefiniteness of the thing to 
be  understood.  What  makes  something  difficult  to 
understand,  on  this  view,  is  the  difficulty  we  have  in 
identifying  legitimate  instances  of  the  thing  we  seek  to 
understand.  
We  therefore  confront  three  sorts  of  reasons  as  to  why 
something  is  difficult  to  understand.  Something  may  be 
difficult to understand because 1) it is structurally complex, 
2) because it is incoherent and ambiguous (i.e. it fails to 
cohere  with  the  elements  of  a  larger  nexus  of  contextual 
elements),  or  3)  because  it  is  vague  and  indistinct.  In 
general, things that are difficult to understand all seem to 
involve  a  knowledge  or  awareness  of  the  relationships 
between various things. Thus, in the case of things that are 
structurally complex, we need to know or be aware of the 
relationships  between  constituent  parts  of  the  object  of 
understanding; in the case of things that are incoherent or 
ambiguous,  we  need  to  know  or  be  aware  of  the 
relationships between the object of understanding and the 
wider relationships it has to external or surrounding objects; 
and in the case of things that are vague, we need to know or 
be  aware  of  the  relationships  (properties)  that  dictate  the 
conditions of category membership. 
So  understanding  may  be  difficult  to  understand  for  a 
variety of reasons, all of which seem to involve, to a greater 
or  lesser  extent,  our  ability  to  know,  identify,  learn, 
discover,  or  use  the  relationships  or  connections  between 
things.  In  the  case  of  understanding,  it  may  be  that  the 
relationships in question concern those with concepts such 
as  meaning,  knowledge,  ability,  and  explanation,  each  of 
which  is,  in  turn,  somewhat  difficult  to  understand. 
Alternatively,  the  relationships  may  concern  those 
associated with the identification of particular instances of 
understanding.  The  large  variety  of  things  that  can  be 
understood,  as  well  as  the  large  number  of  disparate 
performances that seem to manifest understanding, may lie 
at the root of this particular difficulty. Whatever the reasons 
for the difficulty in understanding understanding, the main 
point of this discussion is that it perhaps reveals something 
of  the  nature  of  understanding  (i.e.  what  it  means  to 
understand). Our analysis suggests that understanding seems 
to involve (and is perhaps constituted by) a particular form 
of  knowledge,  namely  knowledge  about  the  inter-
relationships between various things. In order to understand 
something  it  seems  to  be  important  that  relational 
knowledge  is  suitably  poised  to  influence,  guide  and 
constrain thought and action in various ways. 
2.4. What is Understanding? 
We  have  now  scouted  some  of  the  intellectual  terrain 
associated  with  the  notion  of  understanding.  Does  this 
enable us to better understand understanding in any way? 
And  can  we,  by  virtue  of  this  understanding,  propose  an 
adequate  definition  for  both  ‗understanding‘  and  ‗shared 
understanding‘?  In  a  previous  paper,  we  defined 
understanding  as  ―an  ability  to  exploit  bodies  of  causal 
knowledge  (i.e.  knowledge  about  the  antecedents  and 
consequents  of  particular  phenomena)  for  the  purpose  of 
accomplishing cognitive and behavioural goals‖  (Smart et  
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al., 2009b). Understanding was thus cast as particular form 
of  ability,  and  the  ability  in  question  related  to  the 
exploitation of causal knowledge. In part, this definition was 
motivated by an attempt to account for the predictive and 
explanatory performances that seem central to many cases 
of understanding (see Section 2.2). Seen in the light of the 
current  discussion,  however,  the  definition  proposed  in 
Smart et al (2009b) does not seem quite right. While it does 
seem  appropriate  to  regard  understanding  as  a  kind  of 
ability, it does not seem entirely appropriate to equate the 
notion of understanding and ability (see discussion in Baker 
& Hacker, 1980 for more on this). In addition, the attempt to 
equate understanding with a particular kind of (albeit highly 
generic) ability now seems somewhat overstretched. It risks 
restricting the notion of understanding to a particular set of 
performances which may not cover the full range of cases in 
which ascriptions of understanding are made (the definition 
does not, for example, seem to apply to cases of language 
understanding). What might be a better approach is to say 
that a knowledge of causal (and perhaps other) relationships 
is a means by which the exercise of certain abilities is made 
possible. For example, the thoughts and actions that merit 
the ascription of situational understanding to an agent are 
made possible by access to certain kinds of knowledge (e.g. 
knowledge about the causal contingencies between events). 
The  understanding,  in  this  case,  is  not  the  knowledge  of 
causal contingencies per se; it is more the ability to make 
predictions and establish explanations about the situation in 
question.  It  is  clear  that  one‘s  background  knowledge 
supports the exercise of such abilities, but it does not seem 
appropriate to equate understanding with such knowledge. 
What about the third part of Smart et al‘s (2009b) definition 
–  the  part  about  the  purpose  of  an  ability  being  to 
accomplish  cognitive  and  behavioural  goals.  The  original 
motivation for referring to goals in this definition was based 
on the perceived importance of the flexible and adaptive use 
of  knowledge  in  establishing  genuine  cases  of 
understanding. Thus, in order to understand something, we 
claimed,  one  should  be  able  to  adaptively  engage  in 
thoughts  and  actions  that  realize  some  particular  goal. 
Although  we  are  aware  of  the  considerable  opposition  to 
referring to goals in any definition of understanding, we still 
think that goals may be important in terms of understanding 
the nature of understanding. At first blush, it is somewhat 
difficult  to  see  whether  the  notion  of  goals  and 
understanding can really be disentangled; for inasmuch as 
understanding  is  akin  to  an  ability,  then  the  specific 
performances  that  manifest  understanding  may  always  be 
expressed in respect of some goal. For example, if we cast 
understanding  as  an  ability  to  provide  descriptions, 
explanations  and  predictions  about  (e.g.)  a  particular 
situation, then the goals of performances corresponding to 
the exercise of this ability are the ones to describe, explain 
and  predict  situation-relevant  states-of-affairs.  It  is  in 
striving to reach goals that the understanding of an agent is 
manifest.    
In summary, then, it seems that the notion of understanding 
is similar to the notion of an ability. To understand is to be 
able to do things. Typically, understanding is evidenced by 
our  descriptive,  explanatory  and  predictive  successes 
regarding  the  object  of  understanding,  but  there  does  not 
seem to be any firm basis for saying that understanding is a 
particular  form  of  ability;  e.g.,  an  ability  to  predict  or 
explain  something.  It  may  be  that,  in  many  cases,  the 
performances  that  manifest  understanding  require  a 
knowledge of particular relationships (e.g. causal linkages), 
and it may even be the case that our ability to infer those 
(unseen) relationships is one of the criteria for (some forms 
of) understanding. Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that the 
generic  notion  of  understanding  can  be  equated  with  any 
particular set of abilities. 
3. SHARED UNDERSTANDING 
3.1. What is Shared Understanding 
If  understanding  is  akin  to  an  ability,  what  might  shared 
understanding be? The most obvious answer to this question 
is  that  shared  understanding  is  an  ability  (or  something 
similar to an ability) that is common to multiple agents. But 
now  we  face  a  dilemma.  If  understanding  is  akin  to  an 
ability, then it cannot be that the behaviours that manifest 
shared understanding are the same for each agent. This is 
because  the  exercise  of  an  ability  is  not  the  same  as  the 
ability  itself,  and  the  behaviours  corresponding  to  the 
exercise of an ability  may be  many and  varied. As  such, 
how do we ascertain that two or more agents possess shared 
understanding of some target object in spite of the fact that 
the  performances  manifesting  such  understanding  may  be 
wildly multifarious? 
The  best  we  can  do  in  this  situation,  it  seems,  is  to 
determine  whether  the  performances  of  the  agents  in 
question warrant the ascription of the same, or similar, kinds 
of understanding. In this respect, similar performances by 
multiple agents may be sufficient to merit conclusions about 
shared  understanding,  providing  that  the  nature  of  the 
performance warrants the ascription of the same (or similar) 
kinds of understanding to each agent. Thus, two individuals 
who  possess  shared  understanding  will,  at  least  in  some 
cases,  establish  the  same  set  of  (e.g.)  explanations  and 
expectations  given  identical  information  about  (e.g.)  a 
situation  (all  other  things  being  equal).  In  the  case  of 
medical diagnosis, for example, we might conclude that two 
individuals have the same understanding if they are able to 
account for symptoms in the same way, and are additionally 
able  to  anticipate  the  same  set  of  pathophysiological 
outcomes as a result of disease progression. In a coalition 
military context, we might say that two commanders have 
the same (i.e. shared) understanding of a situation if they are 
able to anticipate the same effects of military actions and are 
also  able  to  cite  the  same  reasons  as  to  why  particular 
military  actions  should  be  undertaken  (e.g.,  to  ensure  the 
efficient  realization  of  particular  mission  objectives). 
Clearly, the shared understanding that individuals possess 
(as  determined  by  their  predictive  and  explanatory 
capabilities) will not be identical in most cases. In addition,  
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the shared understanding between individuals will rarely, if 
ever, be complete (see Section 3.2). More likely, individuals 
will possess limited forms of shared understanding that are 
specific to some particular situation or task context. 
Although similarity of performances may be sufficient for 
conclusions  about  shared  understanding,  it  should  not  be 
deemed  as  necessary.  This  is  because  different 
performances  can  still  imply  shared  understanding.  In 
discussions about military coalition operations, for example, 
the notion of shared understanding is typically seen as an 
enabling factor for what is called ‗unity of effort‘. This is 
the  notion  that  coalition  force  elements,  perhaps  from 
different  command  structures,  are  able  to  cooperate  and 
coordinate their efforts in order to realize common mission 
objectives. The specific actions that constitute unity of effort 
are unlikely, it should be clear, to be the  same across all 
force  elements.  Rather,  what  seems  to  matter  is  that  the 
actions  are,  in  some  sense,  complementary  or  compatible 
with  each  other  (when  evaluated  with  respect  to  mission 
objectives).  Presumably,  what  supports  the  expression  of 
these  complementary  or  compatible  actions  is  a  shared 
understanding  about  a  particular  set  of  things,  including 
(perhaps)  an  understanding  of  how  agent  roles, 
responsibilities,  capabilities,  and  goals  relate  to  shared 
mission objectives and the vagaries of the current situation. 
3.2. Shared Understanding: Identity, Similarity or 
Complementarity? 
In  addition  to  attempting  to  provide  a  definition  of 
understanding  and  shared  understanding,  Smart  et  al 
(2009b)  also  discuss  a  number  of  ways  in  which  shared 
understanding  might  be  viewed.  As  Cannon-Bowers  and 
Salas (2001) point out in the context of shared cognition, the 
notion of ‗sharedness‘ can be viewed in multiple ways. One 
interpretation of ‗shared‘ is that it denotes the common or 
joint  possession  of  some  resource  (e.g.,  the  sharing  of  a 
belief  or  item  of  equipment).  An  alternative  view  sees 
‗sharing‘  as  implying  the  division  of  a  resource  between 
multiple recipients (e.g., the sharing of a workload or the 
sharing  of  a  dessert).  This  latter  notion  of  sharing  is 
particularly  relevant  to  team  situations  because  teams 
typically  feature a degree of specialization in  which each 
team  member  undertakes  a  particular  task,  or  element  of 
some  larger  joint  task.  When  it  comes  to  matters  of 
understanding in team situations, it seems that identity or 
similarity of understanding may not always be the thing that 
is  most  desired.  Instead,  what  may  be  required  is  a 
distribution  of  the  responsibility  for  understanding 
something. In this case, individual team members might be 
expected to have a distinct understanding of different parts 
of the shared object of understanding (e.g., a situation or 
system).  Smart  et  al  (2009b)  identify  this  form  of 
understanding  as  ‗complementary  understanding‘  and 
contrast it with two other forms of understanding: ‗identical 
understanding (which  is apparent  when the  understanding 
possessed by two or more agents with respect to some target 
object  is  identical)  and  ‗similar  understanding‘  (which  is 
apparent when the understanding possessed by two or more 
agents  with  respect  to  some  target  object  is  similar  or 
overlapping). 
3.3. A Distributed Cognition Approach to 
Understanding 
In addition to seeing shared understanding as something that 
is a function of the overlap in understanding between two or 
more  agents,  it  is  also  possible  to  view  understanding  as 
something  that  may  (at  least  occasionally)  be  distributed 
across  multiple  agents.  On  this  perspective,  individual 
agents  need  not  necessarily  possess  any  overlap  in  their 
understanding  of  some  target  state-of-affairs;  instead,  the 
understanding may be manifest in the systemic behaviour of 
the  socio-technical  organization  in  which  such  agents  are 
situated. Clearly, this distributed approach to understanding 
requires  a  shift  from  an  individual-level  perspective  to  a 
more systems-level perspective. In particular, it requires us 
to  see  understanding  as  a  property  of  a  larger  system  in 
which  the  dynamics  of  inter-agent  communication  are 
responsible  for  yielding  the  kind  of  explanatory  and 
predictive  successes  that  warrant  the  ascription  of 
understanding to the larger system.   
To make this idea somewhat more concrete, imagine two 
teams  of  human  subjects  each  engaged  in  a  task  that 
requires the explanation and prediction of system states. For 
the sake of argument, let us say that the target system (the 
one whose behaviour is being explained and predicted by 
the teams) is the behaviour of a specific tribal group in a 
military  conflict  zone.  We  assume  that  predictive  and 
explanatory  success  in  this  domain  depends  on  the 
availability of large and heterogeneous bodies of specialist 
knowledge  (perhaps  subtending  disciplines  as  diverse  as 
cultural anthropology, psychology, history, sociology and so 
on), and it is therefore necessary for the two teams to be 
composed  of  experts  from  multiple  disciplines.  The 
objective  of  each  team  is  to  use  the  expertise  of  team 
members  in  order  to  support  the  generation  of  reliable 
predictions and explanations regarding tribal behaviour. To 
the extent that the teams generate similar explanations and 
predictions,  we  may  conclude  that  they  (i.e.,  the  teams) 
possess  shared  understanding  of  the  target  domain
4. But 
note that within each team, the mechanisms that contribute 
to understanding are essentially distributed: the mechanisms 
undergirding explanatorily-  and predictively-potent (team-
level) outcomes are realized by processing loops that extend 
across all team members. It is in precisely this way that 
understanding (or at least the mechanisms that contribute to 
understanding)  can  be  distributed.  Specific  individuals  
within a team need not understand a complex system in 
order for team-level understanding to emerge, and it may 
even be the case that shared understanding between team 
                                                            
4 Similarity of response output is sufficient for conclusions about shared 
understanding in this case because we assume no interdependence between 
the teams with respect to the accomplishment of particular goals. Although 
similarity  of  response  output  may  be  sufficient  for  conclusions  about 
shared understanding in cases such as these, we maintain that similarity of 
response output is not necessary for two or more agents to possess shared 
understanding (see Section 3, for more on this).   
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members is somewhat limited – each member may possess 
unique bodies of expertise and knowledge that is not shared 
with other members of the same team. What is important to 
note  here  is  that  the  mechanisms  that  contribute  to 
understanding  need  not  be  localized  to  the  heads  of 
individual human agents. Instead, they may extend across a 
variety  of  biological  and  (sometimes)  non-biological 
resources.  In  addition,  the  system  that  does  the 
understanding may not necessarily be an individual human 
agent. Instead, it may sometimes be a collection of (often) 
heterogeneous elements comprising multiple human agents, 
intelligent  software  systems,  networked  information 
resources and other technological artefacts. 
Analogues to this distributed approach to understanding are 
apparent  in  the  literature  on  SMMs.  A  core  claim  in  the 
SMMs literature is that greater inter-individual similarity of 
mental models leads to greater similarity in the expectations 
and explanations generated by individuals. This, in turn, is 
seen to result in improved coordination, communication and 
other team behaviours (Rouse et al., 1992). Differences in 
mental  models  are  expected  to  result  in  differences  in 
expectations and explanations. Thus, the best way to ensure 
optimal  team  performance  is  to  ensure  that  individuals 
possess the same mental models. In contrast to this view, 
Banks and Millward (2000) suggest that individuals do not 
need  to  share  mental  models  (at  least  in  the  sense  that 
individuals  possess  similar  models).  Instead  they  propose 
that the cognitive process of running a mental model can be 
divided or distributed amongst team members. One benefit 
of this approach, they argue, is that it avoids the need for 
team members to possess redundant bodies of knowledge. 
By distributing the workload for running the mental model, 
team members effectively spread the load imposed on the 
group; they essentially avoid the effort and work required 
for  individuals  to  assimilate,  maintain  and  execute  full 
mental models of the target system (see Lewis & Sycara, 
2004; Sycara & Lewis, 1991). 
Distributed approaches are also apparent in the literature on 
situation awareness. In this case, Professor Neville Stanton 
and his colleagues have developed a distributed model of 
situation  awareness,  which  has  been  used  in  a  variety  of 
complex sociotechnical environments (Salmon et al., 2009; 
Salmon  et  al.,  2010;  Stanton  et  al.,  2006).  Salmon  et  al 
(2009) argue that the traditional focus of situation awareness 
models, which target the cognitive processes of individual 
operators, are inadequate when it comes to understanding 
the development and maintenance of situation awareness in 
collaborative,  team-based  contexts.  Instead  of  seeing 
situation awareness as something that occurs as a result of 
‗in-the-head‘ processes, they suggest that we should instead 
embrace a distributed cognition approach to understanding 
situation awareness and develop models that emphasize the 
contribution  of  social  and  technological  elements  to  the 
information processing capabilities of the larger system.  
Once  we  take  a  distributed  approach  to  understanding,  it 
becomes  possible  to  entertain  a  different  view  of 
understanding in military coalition contexts. Rather than see 
understanding as something that exists inside the heads of 
individual  human  agents  and  shared  understanding  as 
something  that  inheres  in  the  relationship  between  the 
understanding of individual agents, it becomes possible to 
see  understanding  as  something  that  is  manifest  in  the 
collective behaviour of all the elements that comprise the 
coalition. The coalition becomes, in effect, a kind of socially 
and technologically-extended cognitive machine (see Smart, 
2010); one in which understanding is an emergent property 
of the larger systemic organization (the entire coalition, or 
its constituent force elements), and the interactions between 
a  variety  of  biological,  social,  technological  and 
informational  elements  constitutes  the  thing  that  realizes 
system-level understanding
5.  
4. UNDERSTANDING THE RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN SHARED UNDERSTANDING AND OTHER 
COGNITIVE CONSTRUCTS 
The notions of understanding and shared understanding are 
typically encountered in discussions about a variety of other 
cognitive constructs in the human factors literature. These 
include  discussions  about  mental  models,  situation 
awareness and sensemaking. This section aims to provide a 
better  understanding  of  the  nature  and  inter-relationships 
between these ostensibly similar constructs. 
4.1. Mental Models 
According to Rouse and Morris (1986) mental models are 
the  ―mechanisms  whereby  humans  are  able  to  generate 
descriptions  of  system  purpose  and  form,  explanations  of 
system  functioning  and  observed  system  states,  and 
predictions  of  future  system  states‖  (pg.  351).  Mental 
models  therefore  support  the  expression  of  particular 
abilities, such as those related to the description, explanation 
or prediction of certain things. When it comes to individual 
forms  of  understanding,  therefore,  we  may  see  mental 
models  as  providing  the  mechanistic  basis  of  specific 
performances that warrant the ascription of understanding to 
an agent (see Smart et al., 2009b).  
In team situations, the notion of SMMs (Cannon-Bowers et 
al.,  1990;  Cannon-Bowers  et  al.,  1993)  is  typically 
encountered. SMMs are mental models that are possessed 
by  multiple  individuals,  and  they  are  assumed  to  benefit 
team performance by enabling individuals to anticipate one 
another‘s information requirements. Inasmuch as individual 
mental  models  provide  a  mechanistic  realization  for  the 
performances  that  manifest  individual  forms  of 
understanding, it seems likely that SMMs could support the 
expression of thoughts and actions warranting the ascription 
of  shared  understanding  to  a  collection  of  agents.  It  is, 
however, important to be clear what is and what is not being 
claimed here. One of the claims made in a previous paper 
                                                            
5  In  other  words,  it  is  the  network-mediated  interactions  between 
elements  that  constitutes  the  mechanistic  basis  for  the  expression  of 
system-level behaviours warranting the ascription of understanding to the 
coalition organization (see Smart et al., 2010a, for more on this).  
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(see Smart et al., 2009b) was that SMMs ―may provide one 
means  by  which  shared  forms  of  understanding  may  be 
realized‖.  This  is,  in  fact,  subtly  misleading  because  it 
implies that mental models provide a direct realization of 
understanding. Instead,  it is probably  more appropriate  to 
say that mental models support the expression of behaviours 
(thoughts and actions) that manifest understanding in both 
its  individual  and  shared  forms.  Another  potential 
confusion,  sometimes  encountered  in  the  human  factors 
literature,  is  to  equate  the  notions  of  understanding  and 
mental  models.  This  equation  is  misconceived  because 
understanding is akin to an ability and abilities cannot be 
reduced to the things (vehicles) that explain the exercise of 
the ability. As Baker and Hacker (1980) comment: ―Science 
explains powers by discovering underlying structures, but it 
is a mistake to think that it reduces powers to the structure 
of their vehicle‖ (pg. 337). 
4.2. Situation Awareness 
In addition to mental models, it is important to consider how 
notions of understanding relate to the concepts of SA and 
SSA. According to Endsley (1995), SA is ―the perception of 
the elements in the environment within a volume of space 
and  time,  the  comprehension  of  their  meaning  and  the 
projection of their status in the near future‖ (pg. 36). Two 
elements of this definition seem immediately relevant to our 
notion  of  understanding:  comprehension  and  projection. 
Comprehension implies that individuals who possess SA are 
capable  of  interpreting,  combining  and  prioritizing 
information.  Projection,  on  the  other  hand,  implies  that 
individuals  are  capable  of  formulating  expectations  about 
the occurrence of future events and system states. On the 
basis of Endsley‘s (1995) characterization it would therefore 
seem that SA is something that entails understanding, or at 
least a particular form of understanding. In fact, we suggest 
that SA is indeed best conceived of as a particular form of 
understanding  –  what  we  might  refer  to  as  dynamic 
situational  understanding. The  object  of  understanding  in 
this  case  is,  somewhat  obviously,  a  situation,  and  the 
performances  that  manifest  dynamic  situational 
understanding are those typically encountered in many cases 
of  situational  understanding;  i.e.,  an  ability  to  describe 
elements of the situation, to provide explanations as to how 
the  current  situation  emerged,  and  to  predict  how  the 
situation is likely to evolve in the future. These descriptive, 
predictive  and  explanatory  capabilities  are,  of  course, 
precisely  those  that  seem  to  be  supported  in  the  case  of 
mental  models.  So  perhaps  an  appropriate  theoretical 
integration of the notions of understanding, SA and mental 
models  is  the  following:  mental  models  support  the 
expression of behaviours that warrant the ascription of SA 
to  an  agent,  and  SA  is  a  particular  form  or  type  of 
understanding, namely dynamic situational understanding.      
By  casting  SA  as  a  particular  form  of  understanding,  we 
may  be  able  to  deal  with  a  number  of  issues  that  have 
proved contentious in the SA community. One of these is 
the apparent state/process duality of SA – the tendency for 
SA to sometimes be regarded as a state and at other times as 
a  process  (see  Rousseau  et  al.,  2004).  While  situation 
awareness has, in general, been regarded as a state, it has 
also been seen as a process, and even as both a state and a 
process (see discussion in Rousseau et al., 2004). Even Mica 
Endsley‘s classic definition of situation awareness seems to 
countenance a process-oriented view of situation awareness 
(perception, comprehension and projection all seem to refer 
to  cognitive  processes),  and  this  is  despite  the  fact  that 
Endsley  herself  insists  that  situation  awareness  should  be 
characterized as a state rather than a process, arguing that 
the processes giving rise to situation awareness should be 
characterized  instead  as  situation  assessment
6  rather than 
situation awareness. 
By casting SA as a form of understanding, we  can offer a 
potential resolution to the debate regarding the state/process 
duality of SA. In particular, if situation awareness is a form 
of understanding, then we can conclude that  it is neither a 
state nor a pr ocess.  This is the case because we saw in 
Section 2.1 that understanding should not be categorized as 
a state or  a  process. The  problem with this conclusion, 
however, is that the reasons for stating that SA is a form of 
understanding  now seem to conflict   with the reasons that 
were given as to why understanding should not be regarded 
as a state. Recall from Section  2.1 that we rejected the idea 
of understanding as a state because understanding did not 
seem to have the essential properties of a state. In particular, 
states were seen as having genuine duration, whereas it did 
not  seem  appropriate  to  see  understanding  as  having 
genuine duration. While it does seem appropriate, therefore, 
to say that someone could be in a  state of anxiety for 5 
minutes, it does not seem appropriate to say that  someone 
could be  in a state of understanding for 5 minutes.   The 
implication  is  that  anxiety  is  a  kind  of  state,  whereas 
understanding is not. If true, this seems to  rule out the 
possibility that SA is a state because we have said that SA it 
is a type of understanding, and we have also stated that the 
notions of understanding and states  are disjoint. However, 
the notion of dynamic situation understanding, which we 
have equated with the notion of situation awareness , does 
seem to involve a commitment to the idea of understanding 
as having genuine duration. Thus, it does seem appropriate 
to say that someone understood a situation for 5 minutes, 
and then their understanding broke down, perhaps because 
they received inaccurate information about how the situation 
was  evolving.  It  is  this  notion  of  dynamic  situational 
understanding  as  something  that  needs  to  be  constantly 
maintained in the face of a dynamic, continuously evolving 
situation  that  makes  it  so  appealing  as  a  synonym  for 
situation  awareness.  However,  at  the  same  time,  it  is 
precisely this feature that seems to undermine the idea that 
(situational) understanding should be seen as distinct from 
states. At this point, it seems, we have four options: 
                                                            
6  Situation  assessment  is,  in  fact,  another  construct  whose  precise 
relationship to understanding deserves clarification. Situation assessment is 
most  commonly  seen  as  a  process  of  gathering  information  about  a 
situation, and it most closely resembles the notion of sensemaking (see 
Section 4.3). In all likelihood, situation assessment can be seen as a specific 
form of sensemaking; one in which sensemaking processes are geared to 
understanding a specific object, namely, a situation.  
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1)  Conclude that understanding, or at least some forms of 
understanding,  can  have  genuine  duration  and  seek 
some other basis (one that does not appeal to notions of 
genuine duration) for claiming that understanding is not 
a state. This might enable us to preserve our original 
conjecture that SA is neither a state nor a process.  
2)  Conclude that understanding, or at least some forms of 
understanding, can have genuine duration and that the 
notions of state and understanding are not disjoint. This 
conclusion  would  inevitably  mean  rejecting 
Wittgenstein‘s  claims  about  the  nature  of 
understanding, and it would also force us to reconsider 
our original conjecture that SA is neither a state nor a 
process (because such a conclusion would no longer be 
necessarily true). 
3)  Conclude  that  no  forms  of  understanding  can  have 
genuine  duration  and  that,  as  a  result,  they  are  not 
states.  This  might  also  lead  to  the  conclusion  that 
because SA does have genuine duration it is not a form 
of  understanding.  This  conclusion  leaves  the 
relationship  between  understanding  and  SA 
uncomfortably  vague,  and  this  is  especially  galling 
given that understanding seems highly relevant to our 
commonsense intuitions about what SA actually is. 
4)  Conclude  that  no  forms  of  understanding  can  have 
genuine duration, but still insist that dynamic situation 
understanding  and  SA  are  synonymous.  This  implies 
that SA does not have genuine duration; i.e., it is not 
appropriate  to  talk  of  an  individual  having  SA  for  a 
particular period of time.  
Choosing  between  these  options  will  require  additional 
work to explore what is meant by the notion of situation 
awareness  and  whether  it  really  makes  sense  to  see  it  as 
something that has the property of genuine duration. 
4.3. Sensemaking 
Another construct that may be confused with understanding 
is  what  has  been  referred  to  as  sensemaking  and  (in  a 
collective contexts) as team sensemaking. Sensemaking is a 
construct  that  is  typically  encountered  in  discussions  of 
situation  awareness,  and  there  have  been  a  number  of 
attempts to distinguish between the two constructs. Thus, 
whereas situation awareness has typically been understood 
in  terms  of  the  knowledge  an  operator  has  of  situation-
relevant information (i.e. it has been seen as a mental state), 
sensemaking seems to be best characterized as a process, or 
set of processes, rather than a state of knowledge. Klein et al 
(2006)  thus  see  sensemaking  as  ―a  motivated,  continuous 
effort  to  understand  connections  (which  can  be  among 
people,  places,  and  events)  in  order  to  anticipate  their 
trajectories  and  act  effectively‖  (pg.  71).  Based  on  these 
notions of situation awareness and sensemaking, one might 
be tempted to conclude that sensemaking is a process that 
contributes  to  a  state  of  situation  awareness,  and  team 
sensemaking  is  something  that  contributes  to  a  state  of 
shared situation awareness. 
Notwithstanding  the  issues  raised  in  the  previous  section 
regarding the state/process duality of situation awareness, it 
is important to recognize that the integrity of this simplistic 
view of the relationship between sensemaking and situation 
awareness  is  complicated  by  a  number  of  factors.  One 
problem is that even if it is true that sensemaking does give 
rise  to  situation  awareness,  it  is  not  clear  that  it  is 
necessarily true. Thus, while sensemaking may indeed be 
involved in the formation of situation awareness, in at least 
some cases, it is not clear that it is a necessary feature of 
situation  awareness.  Klein  et  al‘s  (2006)  definition  casts 
sensemaking  as  a  process  of  deliberate  and  effortful 
information  acquisition  and  integration,  but  it  seems  that 
some kinds of situation awareness do not involve this kind 
of deliberate and effortful process. For example, drawing on 
Gary Klein‘s (Klein, 1993) previous work into naturalistic 
decision making, Kaempf et al (1996) discovered that 95% 
of  tactical  military  commanders  relied  on  a  strategy  of 
recognition-primed  decision  making  to  interpret  situation-
relevant  information.  In  other  words,  in  order  to  achieve 
situation awareness, the commanders in this study relied on 
a  process  of  matching  specific  features  to  pre-existing 
situation schemas. As Endsley (2004) is at pains to point out 
here, the commanders in this study did not achieve situation 
awareness as a result of a deliberate and effortful process of 
information gathering, manipulation and synthesis. Instead, 
they accomplished situation awareness via an instantaneous 
and  reflexive  process  of  situation  recognition.  Endsley 
(2004) suggests that sensemaking closely resembles a subset 
of the process involved in situation awareness. In particular, 
she suggests that sensemaking is  ―the process of forming 
level 2 SA from level 1 data through effortful processes of 
gathering and synthesizing information‖ (pg. 324). 
In  terms  of  the  relationship  between  sensemaking  and 
understanding, it is probably the case that sensemaking can 
be seen as one of the means by which understanding comes 
about
7. In other words, sensemaking should be seen as a set 
of deliberate processes employed to establish, maintain and 
validate  understanding.  At  the  level  of  individual 
understanding, sensemaking processes probably subsume all 
manner  of  interactions  and  engagements  with   social, 
technological and informational resources; however, in the 
case of shared understanding, the processes are probably 
more  limited, perhaps being restricted to forms of   social 
interaction  and  communication.  In  all  likelihood, 
sensemaking processes are employed in situations where 
experience is limited or when  information is  ambiguous, 
unreliable, and conflicting. As Endsley  (2004) suggests in 
relation to situation awareness, sensemaking processes are 
perhaps sufficient to yield understanding, but they need not 
                                                            
7  In  fact,  the  focus  of  the  current  paper  in  trying  to  understand 
understanding (and shared understanding) might be construed as a form of 
sensemaking. In this case, the aim is to understand understanding, and the 
processes  that  lead  to  that  understanding  are  sensemaking  processes. 
Certainly,  the  current undertaking bears  all  the  apparent hallmarks  of a 
sensemaking process: it is a deliberate, motivated and effortful process of 
gathering  and  synthesizing  information  in  order  to  understand  the 
connections between things (for example, the connections between notions 
of ‗understanding‘ and ‗sensemaking‘).  
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be necessary for understanding
8.  
4.4. Summary 
We  have  seen  that  considerable  confusion  and  ambiguity 
exists  regarding  the  appropriate  use  of  terms  such  as 
sensemaking,  situation  awareness,  and  understanding. 
Additional confusion is encountered  when these (and other 
constructs) are applied in a collective, team-based setting. 
Thus,  the  relationships  between  notions  such  as  team 
sensemaking (Klein et al., 2010), team situation awareness 
(Brannick  et  al.,  1999),  distributed  situation  awareness 
(Salmon  et  al.,  2009),  shared  mental  models  (Cannon-
Bowers et al., 1993), and shared understanding (Smart et al., 
2009a) are all somewhat vague at the present time. In order 
to  develop  an  understanding  of  understanding  it  is 
imperative that we understand how these notions relate to 
one  another.  Establishing  what  effectively  amounts  to  a 
formal  ontology  of  these  constructs  will  enable  us  to 
identify and reuse appropriate elements of existing models 
in  the  research  literature  as  well  as  identify  relevant 
technology components that have been developed in other 
human factors contexts. 
5. SHARED UNDERSTANDING AND MILITARY 
COALITIONS 
5.1. Why is Shared Understanding Important in Military 
Coalitions? 
As mentioned in the introduction, shared understanding is 
something  that  is  seen  as  important  to  military  coalition 
operations;  however,  the  precise  contribution  of  shared 
understanding  to  such  operations  is  currently  unclear. 
Perhaps  the  main  reason  why  shared  understanding  is 
important  relates  to  the  need  for  coalition  elements  to 
coordinate their efforts in respect of some common or joint 
goal.  In  this  case,  shared  understanding  might  fulfil  the 
same function for military coalitions as mental models do in 
the case of team performance: it enables coalition elements 
to  predict  and  anticipate  one  another‘s  behaviours  and 
information  requirements.  In  the  context  of  the  SMM 
literature, the ability to anticipate information requirements 
and proactively provide information in advance of its actual 
use  has  been  shown  to  improve  team  effectiveness  in  a 
number of empirical studies (Oser et al., 1990; Stout et al., 
1999). Similar performance benefits might apply in the case 
of shared understanding and coalition operations. 
Another  reason  for  the  apparent  importance  of  shared 
understanding  in  coalition  operations  could  relate  to  the 
efficient use of limited communication resources. Inasmuch 
as  shared  understanding  contributes  to  the  realization  of 
efficient  modes  of  inter-agent  communication  and 
                                                            
8 Of course, if the conjecture mentioned in the previous section about 
situation awareness being a form of dynamic situational understanding is 
correct, then we are justified in seeing sensemaking as a set of processes 
that  (potentially)  give  rise  to  situation  awareness  (dynamic  situation 
understanding), and which typically need to be executed in a more or less 
continuous  fashion  in  order  to  maintain  situation  awareness  (dynamic 
situational understanding). 
coordination, it may have particular value in the context of 
coalition operations. This is because coalition environments 
are often resource-constrained environments in which power 
overheads and network traffic must be kept to a minimum. 
If  shared  understanding  improves  the  efficiency  of  inter-
agent  communication  (perhaps  reducing  the  need  for 
communication  altogether),  it  may  contribute  to  the 
optimized use of limited network assets. 
In  addition  to  supporting  improved  performance  and 
optimizing  the  use  of  available  resources,  shared 
understanding  may  also  be  important  for  factors  such  as 
group  cohesion,  group  solidarity  and  trust.  Intuitively,  it 
seems that an ability to anticipate the information needs of 
team-mates  and  behave  in  a  way  that  accords  with  the 
expectations of others could be a key ingredient of what it 
means  for  someone  to  be  regarded  as  a  ‗team  player‘. 
Inasmuch  as  this  is  the  case,  we  may  expect  shared 
understanding to be an important contributor to a range of 
psychoaffective  outcomes  as  well  as  group  performance 
variables.  
5.2. Issues for Shared Understanding Research in 
Military Coalition Contexts 
There are a number of issues for future research concerning 
shared  understanding  in  military  coalition  contexts.  This 
section  provides  an  overview  of  (at  least  some  of)  these 
issues. 
Who (or what) shares the understanding? 
Given the notion of understanding as something akin to an 
ability  and  shared  understanding  as  the  sharing  of  that 
ability,  the  possession  of  shared  understanding  makes  no 
commitment  about  the  nature  of  the  realizing  mechanism 
underlying shared understanding – two or more individuals 
could  possess  the  same  or  similar  understanding  whilst 
using  completely  different  realizing  mechanisms.  What 
implication does this have for our notions of who (or what) 
is deemed to possess shared understanding? Must it always 
be  the  case  that  notions  of  shared  understanding  are 
developed with regard to individual human agents, or can 
collections  of  human  (and  perhaps  machine)  agents  also 
possess shared understanding? 
Besides  the  question  of  whether  shared  understanding  is 
something  possessed  by  individuals,  groups  or  machine 
entities,  there  is  also  the  question  of  who  should  share 
understanding in particular task contexts. Military coalitions 
have complex group structures and group dynamics. Small 
ad  hoc  teams  may  be  assembled  in  response  to  specific 
challenges,  and  large  scale  operations  may  necessitate 
complex  patterns  of  inter-team  coordination  and 
collaboration. Such complexity raises questions about how 
we  should  identify  which  subset  of  individuals  need  to 
possess  shared  understanding,  and  what  kind  of  shared 
understanding (e.g. scope and depth) they should possess. 
What is the value of shared understanding? 
A key question for future research in coalition contexts is  
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the  relationship  between  shared  understanding  and  group 
performance  outcomes.  Shared  understanding  may  be 
important for the accuracy, quality, volume and timeliness 
of task outcomes, and future research should clearly aim to 
explore  this  possibility.  Another  effect  of  shared 
understanding may be to enhance team processes or team 
behaviours.  For  example,  shared  understanding  may 
improve inter-agent communication, enabling both  human 
and  synthetic  agents  to  anticipate  the  information 
requirements of team-mates and provide them with advance 
information.  Shared  understanding  may  also  improve  the 
efficiency  of  communication  or  reduce  the  need  for 
communication altogether. This can be useful in terms of 
reducing the burden on communication systems that may be 
limited  in  terms  of  their  available  bandwidth  and  power. 
Finally,  it  is  possible  that  greater  levels  of  shared 
understanding  may  deliver  a  number  of  beneficial 
‗psychoaffective‘  outcomes.  These  could  include  things 
such as improved morale, trust and team satisfaction. 
Is shared understanding always desirable? 
Even  if  shared  understanding  can  be  found  to  exert  a 
positive effect on performance in some situations, it is by no 
means  clear  that  we  should  strive  to  enhance  shared 
understanding  in  every  situation.  There  are  clearly  some 
situations in which shared understanding will be difficult to 
establish (e.g.  multi-disciplinary teams of experts that are 
brought  together  to  collaboratively  resolve  a  complex 
problem).  Moreover,  in  some  situations,  shared 
understanding may stifle creativity or contribute to negative 
group behaviours such as groupthink (Janis, 1982). 
What factors contribute to shared understanding? 
Inasmuch  as  SMMs  can  be  considered  as  one  of  the 
realizing mechanisms for shared understanding, then some 
of the interventions that have been proposed to foster the 
development  of  SMM  may  be  important  in  the  quest  to 
enhance shared understanding  (Smith-Jentsch et al., 2008; 
Stout et al., 1999). It should be remembered, however, that 
many  of  these  interventions  are  based  on  small-team 
situations  and  they  may  not  be  suitable  for  the  kind  of 
environments  in  which  coalition  operations  are  typically 
undertaken.  In  addition,  coalition  operations  feature  a 
diversity of groups differing with respect to factors such as 
entitativity, permeability, size, culture and opportunities for 
interpersonal  (face-to-face)  interaction.  This  suggests  that 
the  factors  contributing  to  shared  understanding  may  be 
highly  heterogeneous,  and  that  interventions  aimed  at 
enhancing  shared understanding  will need to consider the 
nature  of  groups,  as  well  as  the  dynamics  of  inter-group 
interaction. 
What kind of understanding is required? 
The kind of understanding that needs to be shared by two or 
more agents will vary depending on the nature of the tasks 
in which the agents participate, as well as the nature of the 
agents  themselves  (e.g.,  whether  they  are  all  humans, 
software  agents  or  some  mixture  of  the  two)  (Sycara  & 
Lewis,  2004).  For  example,  shared  understanding  may 
target aspects of a particular situation, the dynamics of team 
interaction or the strategies that need to be pursued in order 
to  realize  task  goals.  Future  research  thus  needs  to  be 
sensitive  to  the  kind  of  understanding  that  is  required  in 
particular situations
9.  
6. MEASURING UNDERSTANDING AND SHARED 
UNDERSTANDING 
The notion that shared understanding is akin to the sharing 
of  an  ability  (or  something  like  an  ability)  does  not 
necessarily  help  us  in  pinpointing  a  specific  set  of 
techniques  that  can  be  used  to  measure  shared 
understanding. The characterization does, however, at least 
suggest that shared understanding is the kind of thing that 
can be measured. By casting shared understanding as a kind 
of  shared  ability,  the  process  of  measuring  shared 
understanding  emerges  as  the  measurement  of  shared 
abilities. And abilities (shared or otherwise) are clearly the 
kinds of things that can (in principle) be measured. What 
seems to be important when it comes to the measurement of 
shared understanding is to determine the kinds of responses 
that warrant the ascription of understanding to an individual 
and then to develop a way of measuring those responses. So, 
if we want to determine whether two individuals have the 
same understanding of a specific situation, we may need to 
decide that the kind of understanding we are interested in is 
evidenced by an ability to 1) identify what events led to the 
current situation, 2) predict how the situation will evolve in 
the  future,  and  3)  determine  the  kinds  of  constraints  and 
opportunities that the situation presents for ongoing military 
actions. Following this characterization, we can devise tests 
that  tap  into  these  abilities.  Admittedly,  the  process  of 
designing and validating these tests is likely to be a difficult 
undertaking.  In  all  likelihood,  the  nature  of  the  tests  to 
measure  shared  understanding  will  vary  according  to  the 
measurement  context  –  the  kind  of  thing  that  is  to  be 
understood, the people who do the understanding, and so on. 
As such, the development of a single all-purpose test  for 
shared  understanding  is  something  that  is  unlikely  to  be 
achieved. There may, however, be some value in looking at 
general  approaches  to  the  assessment  of  understanding. 
White and Gunstone (1992), for example, describe a range 
of techniques, primarily for use in educational contexts, that 
can be used to probe understanding. These include the use 
of concept maps, relational diagrams and word association 
tests. By adapting these techniques for specific application 
contexts  (e.g.,  understanding  military  coalition  plans),  we 
might obtain measurements of understanding that can then 
be compared across multiple individuals.  
In addition to these techniques, we might be able to draw on 
the  idea  that  mental  models  can  be  used  to  index  an 
                                                            
9  It  should  also  be  remembered  that  multiple  forms  of  shared 
understanding may be conceptualized (see Section  3.2), and that not all 
these forms of shared understanding require agents to posses similar or 
overlapping abilities. In some task contexts, it may make more sense to 
adopt a more distributed perspective with respect to shared understanding 
(see Section 3.3).  
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individual‘s  understanding  of  some  domain  and  that  the 
similarity between mental models might therefore provide a 
measure of shared understanding. One type of mental model 
that may prove particularly useful here are cultural models 
(Sieck et al., 2010), which are typically used to support the 
analysis  of  cultural  differences  in  target  communities. 
Importantly, cultural  models can be pitched at the level of 
specific  individuals  or  groups,  so  their  value  in  terms  of 
measuring shared understanding is not just that they provide 
a  means  to  assess  inter-individual  differences  in  shared 
understanding, they can also be used to assess differences in 
understanding between particular groups. This is important 
when  it  comes  to  a  consideration  of  military  coalitions. 
Because  military  coalitions  feature  multiple  groups  of 
individuals (e.g., from particular nations, military services 
or ethno-linguistic categories), we will often want to assess 
shared understanding at the group or collective level. That 
is, rather than focus on the extent of shared understanding 
between specific individuals (as we might do in the case of a 
small team), in a coalition context we often want to assess 
the extent of shared understanding between specific groups 
of individuals. This is a feature that is not easily provided by 
other approaches to measuring shared understanding (e.g., 
the approaches discussed by White and Gunstone (1992)), 
and, as such, the use of cultural models to measure shared 
understanding  in  coalition  contexts  may  have  much  to 
commend it.   
An example of a cultural model (in this case applied to the 
domain of military planning) is shown in Fig. 1. The nodes 
in this diagram represent concepts and properties associated 
with the domain of planning, and the linkages between the 
concepts  reflect  the  community‘s  beliefs  regarding  the 
relationships and dependencies between the concepts. The 
links  associated  with  a  plus  sign  reflect  a  positive 
association between the concepts (e.g., ‗Level of detail in 
specification  of  action‘  has  a  positive  effect  on  ease  of 
execution  (i.e.  ‗Ability  to  execute  easily‘)),  whereas  the 
links  associated  with  a  minus  sign  reflect  negative 
associations  between  the  concepts  (e.g.,  ‗Ability  to 
anticipate problems‘ has a negative effect on the perceived 
riskiness of a plan (i.e. ‗Plan risk‘)).  
One thing that makes cultural models interesting in terms of 
understanding  is  that  their  content  is  often  based  on  an 
individual‘s or group‘s knowledge of causal contingencies 
in  a  particular  domain  of  discourse.  This  establishes  a 
natural  linkage  with  previous  attempts  to  provide  a 
definition  of  understanding.  Thus,  Smart  et  al  (2009b) 
proposed  that  understanding  corresponds  to  an  ability  to 
exploit  bodies  of  causal  knowledge.  Inasmuch  as  cultural 
models can be seen to represent the kind of knowledge that 
enables  an  individual  to  manifest  behaviours  (e.g., 
explanations and predictions of system states) that warrant 
the ascription of understanding to an agent, then they may 
provide a potential realizing mechanism for at least some 
forms  of  understanding.  This  is  significant  because  it 
suggests  that  one  way  of  measuring  the  similarity  of 
understanding between agents (either individuals or groups) 
is  to  assess  the  structural  isomorphism  of  the  cultural 
models developed for the agents in question. If the models 
are identical, then the level of shared understanding between 
the agents concerned will be at its theoretical maximum; if 
the models bear no resemblance to one another, then shared 
 
Fig. 1. Cultural model showing the dependencies between concepts in the domain of military coalition planning.  
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understanding will be at its minimum. In between these two 
extremes, we will encounter variable degrees of similarity 
between  the  models,  and  such  similarity  will  (at  least 
potentially) provide a measure of shared understanding.  
What  is  required,  then,  is  some  way  of  computing  the 
structural  similarity  of  cultural  models.  This  is  where  we 
encounter the first of three problems associated with the use 
of cultural models to assess shared understanding. The fact 
is  that  the  technique  used  to  develop  cultural  models  (a 
technique known as cultural network analysis (Sieck et al., 
2010)  does  not,  at  the  present  time,  provide  a  means  of 
assessing  the  structural  isomorphism  of  cultural  models. 
This problem might be addressed by turning to the literature 
on SMMs (Cannon-Bowers et al., 1990; Cannon-Bowers et 
al., 1993). SMMs are mental models that are possessed by 
multiple individuals, and they are typically operationalized 
as  the  correlation  between  link-weighted  networks  using 
Pathfinder  analysis  (Schvaneveldt  et  al.,  1985).  The 
adaptation of such techniques for the comparative analysis 
of cultural models may serve as the basis for deriving future 
quantitative measures of cultural model similarity.  
Two  additional  problems  are  associated  with  the  use  of 
cultural models to index shared understanding. Firstly, the 
process  of  creating  cultural  models  is  somewhat  labour-
intensive. This means that it might not be suitable for all 
cases in which shared understanding needs to be assessed. 
Secondly, it is not always clear that structural differences in 
cultural  models  necessarily  indicate  differences  in 
understanding.  The  reason  for  this  is  twofold:  firstly,  a 
cultural  model  does  not  equate  to  understanding,  and, 
secondly, differences in cultural models need not result in 
different abilities. In terms of the former issue, there is a 
tendency,  sometimes  encountered  in  the  human  factors 
literature, to equate the notions of understanding and mental 
models.  As  was  discussed  in  Section  4.1,  this  is 
misconceived.  
The  second  reason  why  structural  differences  in  cultural 
models  do  not  necessarily  indicate  differences  in 
understanding  is  because  of  what  has,  in  the  shared 
cognition  literature,  been  referred  to  as  equifinality 
(Mathieu et al., 2005). This is the  idea that two or  more 
individuals may be able to generate the same expectations 
and  explanations  despite  expressing  differences  in  their 
respective  mental  models.  This  is  important  because  it  is 
typically the expectations and explanations that are deemed 
to be the main focus of interest from the perspective of team 
performance. As Cannon-Bowers et al (1993) argue: ―[the] 
function or benefit of shared mental models is that they lead 
to  common  expectations  of  the  task  and  team,  it  is  the 
expectations rather than the mental models themselves that 
must be shared.‖ Something similar can be seen to be the 
case  for  cultural  models.  Thus,  from  the  perspective  of 
understanding,  what  counts  are  the  performances  that 
manifest understanding, not the mechanisms that make such 
performances possible. While similar cultural models may 
be highly suggestive of similar abilities, particularly when it 
comes to forming explanations and predictions in the target 
domain, it need not be the case that such differences will 
always  translate  to  differences  in  inter-individual 
understanding.  
Despite these caveats, the use of cultural models to index 
shared  understanding  may  be  of  value  in  at  least  some 
contexts.  Thus,  while  differences  in  cultural  models  need 
not always indicate a lack of shared understanding, some 
types of cultural  model  may be  much  more  suitable than 
others in terms of revealing such differences. For example, 
if  the  content  of  the  cultural  model  is  focused  on  an 
individual‘s  causal  knowledge  of  some  domain,  then  it 
seems  likely  that  differences  in  the  cultural  models  will 
reveal  at  least  some  differences  in  the  explanatory  and 
predictive  abilities  of  the  individuals  concerned.  Further 
research  needs  to  be  undertaken  in  order  to  explore  this 
possibility.  
7. REPRESENTING SHARED UNDERSTANDING: A 
NETWORK-BASED APPROACH 
In undertaking scientific research on shared understanding, 
researchers  need  analytical  and  presentational  techniques 
that support their understanding of the various factors that 
influence shared understanding. One recent suggestion is to 
use network-based representations to support the analysis of 
shared understanding (Smart et al., 2010e). This approach is 
based on the use of semantic networks,  which have been 
used  on  the  organizational  communication  literature,  to 
explore  the  shared  interpretations  that  people  have  of 
organizational message content. The current section outlines 
the  use  of  semantic  networks  to  represent,  visualize  and 
analyse shared understanding in military coalition contexts. 
7.1. Semantic Networks 
In  order  to  explore  the  shared  interpretations  that  people 
have of organizational message content (particularly those 
messages  that  highlight  important  elements  of  an 
organization‘s  culture,  such  as  corporate  goals,  slogans, 
myths and stories), Monge and Eisenberg (1987) developed 
a technique that relies on the network-based articulation of 
individual differences (and similarities) in the interpretation 
of message content. The basic approach adopted by Monge 
and  Eisenberg  (1987)  was  to  measure  peoples‘ 
interpretations  of  message  content,  and  then  create  a 
network of weighted links, with each node in the network 
representing a specific individual and each link representing 
the extent of agreement between individuals. They referred 
to the resulting network as a ‗semantic network‘
10. 
                                                            
10 It is important to understand that the notion of a semantic network in 
this  context  differs  from  that  which  is  encountered  in  the  artificial 
intelligence  and  cognitive  science  literatures.  In  the  organizational 
communication literature, the notion of a semantic network refers to the 
similarity  of  individuals‘  interpretations  of  particular  things  (e.g., 
messages,  events  or  artefacts),  whereas  in  the  artificial  intelligence  and 
cognitive  science  literatures  the  notion  of  a  semantic  network  most 
commonly refers to a network representing the semantic relations between 
a  number  of  concepts.  The  use  of  the  term  ‗semantic  network‘  in  the  
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The  process  of  constructing  a  semantic  network  is  quite 
straightforward.  Given  a  set  of  scores  reflecting  peoples‘ 
response to organizational messages (or anything else), we 
can construct a network of weighted linkages that reflects 
the  extent  of  inter-individual  similarity  between  those 
scores. Although it is possible to include the links between 
all  individuals  in  these  networks  (i.e..  to  produce  fully-
connected  semantic  networks),  it  is  often  more  useful  to 
restrict the number of links that appear in the network. An 
upper  threshold  can  be  imposed  on  the  inter-individual 
similarity scores in order to determine what similarity scores 
will actually appear in the final network. The application of 
this filter results in a variety of complex network structures.  
 
Fig.  2.  Semantic  network  of  inter-individual  similarity  scores 
following the application of a threshold criterion (any link with a 
weighting  value  below a  specified  value  is  eliminated  from  the 
network). 
Fig.  2  illustrates  a  semantic  network  constructed  from  a 
matrix  of  inter-individual  similarity  scores  following  the 
application of a threshold criterion. The number of nodes in 
this  network  corresponds  to  the  number  of  people  in  the 
target population. The network-based representation reveals 
a  number  of  important  facts  about  the  distribution  of 
interpretations in the target population. For a start, we can 
see  from  Fig.  2  that  there  are  two  distinct  clusters  of 
individuals. These clusters (or cliques) represent two sub-
groups  that  are  differentiated  with  respect  to  their 
interpretations.  Within  each  sub-group,  individuals  share 
similar interpretations, but these interpretations are different 
from those of individuals belonging to the other subgroup. 
We can also see that one individual (node C) is an isolate. 
This  individual  has  an  interpretation  that  differs  from  all 
other members of the focal population. Another feature of 
                                                                                                  
current paper is intended to reflect the former usage of the term; i.e., a 
semantic  network  refers  to  a  network  representation  of  inter-individual 
similarities (or differences). 
the network representation is its ability to highlight nodes of 
particular interest. Thus, we can see that nodes A and B are 
‗bridging‘  or  ‗liaison‘  nodes.  They  provide  weak  links 
between one sub-group and the other sub-group. Such nodes 
may  have  particular  significance  when  it  comes  to 
understanding the contribution of particular individuals to 
coordinating  interpretations  between  different  sub-groups. 
Other  features  of  the  network  representation  include  the 
following:  
  the overall connectivity of the network highlights the 
degree or extent of commonality in the interpretations 
of the entire population, 
  the  number  of  links  associated  with  a  specific 
individual  indicates  that  that  individual  has 
interpretations in common with lots of other individuals 
  a  disconnected  component  (disconnected  subset  of 
nodes)  indicates  a  group  of  members  who  lack  any 
commonality with the wider population, and 
  an  individual  who  has  high  degree  centrality  in  the 
semantic network is one who shares interpretations in 
common with many other individuals. 
The question that emerges at this point is to  what extent 
semantic networks can be  usefully applied to support the 
analysis of shared understanding. In fact, the application  is 
quite  straightforward  since  the  distinction  between  the 
notions of shared interpretations and shared understanding is 
not one that is necessarily clear-cut. Monge and Contractor 
(2003),  for  example,  suggest  that  a  semantic  network 
―provides  a  picture  of  the  groups  of  people  who  share 
common  understandings‖  (pg.  187)  [emphasis  added].  In 
the next section, we move away from a discussion of shared 
interpretations and talk explicitly about the use of semantic 
networks to support the visualization and representation of 
shared understanding.  
7.2. Using Semantic Networks to Represent Shared 
Understanding 
One  thing  that  should  be  clear  from  the  discussion  in 
Section  7.1  is  that  providing  we  can  obtain  a  reliable 
measure of individual understanding, we can easily create a 
network-based  representation  of  shared  understanding. 
Nothing  restricts  the  application  of  semantic  networks  to 
interpretations of message content, and, providing we can 
measure  understanding,  the  process  of  developing  a 
semantic network representation of shared understanding is 
relatively  straightforward.  When  used  to  represent  shared 
understanding,  semantic  networks  yield  a  number  of 
important  benefits  and  opportunities.  For  example,  the 
network-based  representation  supports  the  easy  visual 
identification of particular features, such as those listed in 
Section 7.1. Thus, semantic networks can reveal individuals 
(known as ‗stars‘) whose understanding is similar to those 
of many others, individuals that serve to link two or more 
otherwise  disconnected  groups  (known  as  ‗liaisons‘),  and 
individuals whose interpretations are at odds with everyone 
else‘s  (known  as  ‗isolates‘).  The  structural  profile  of  a  
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semantic  network  across  time  can  also  reveal  important 
insights as to how shared understanding emerges within a 
particular  community.  A  sudden  transition  in  network 
density, for example, indicates discontinuous jumps in the 
level  of  shared  understanding,  while  a  slow,  progressive 
increase in network connectivity indicates a more gradual 
form  of  emergence.  Importantly,  this  ability  to  monitor 
dynamic  changes  in  network  structure  across  time  has 
profound  implications  for  the  scientific  study  of  shared 
understanding.  Any  manipulation  that  enhances  shared 
understanding within the target population will be reflected 
in an increase in the overall connectivity of the network, as 
well as an increase in the strength of connections between 
particular nodes. A decrease in shared understanding will be 
reflected  in  a  progressive  weakening  of  the  connection 
strengths  and,  eventually,  a  fragmentation  of  the  network 
into  distinct  components.  As  such,  the  structural  analysis 
(across time) of semantic networks can serve a number of 
useful  purposes.  In  particular,  it  can  highlight  important 
changes or fluctuations in shared understanding (as when a 
previously highly connected network component, reflecting 
high levels of shared understanding, begins to fragment into 
smaller constituents). It can also (potentially) shed light on 
the ways in which shared understanding develops within a 
community  across  time.  For  example,  if  we  note  that  a 
semantic  network  (representing  inter-individual 
commonalities in understanding) begins to grow according 
to a particular law (say the law of preferential attachment), 
then we can hypothesize that the understanding achieved by 
certain  individuals  (those  to  which  others  preferentially 
attach)  may  represent  a  form  of  understanding  through 
which all individuals must go en route to the realization of 
shared understanding. Semantic networks may also help us 
understand some of the factors that contribute to changes in 
shared  understanding.  For  example,  we  can  monitor 
dynamic changes in the values of particular network-level 
variables  (e.g.,  average  path  length,  inclusivity,  density, 
centralization,  etc.),  or  the  variables  associated  with 
particular nodes (e.g., degree, centrality, closeness, etc.), in 
response to certain  manipulations or events. Of particular 
interest, is the fact that we can use semantic networks to 
assess  the  effect  of  other  types  of  networks  on  dynamic 
changes  in  a  community‘s  shared  understanding.  Thus, 
suppose  we  are  interested  in  how  the  topology  of  a 
communication  network  impacts the  emergence of  shared 
understanding within a community. We can begin to assess 
this by investigating how the features of one network (the 
communication  network)  affect  the  features  of  another 
network (the semantic network). This was, in fact, one of 
the early motivations for introducing semantic networks into 
the organizational communication literature:  
―An  early  motivation  for  the  study  of  semantic 
networks  was  to  disambiguate  the  relationship 
between  communication  and  shared  understanding. 
A  semantic  network  perspective  challenges  the 
received  view  that  communication  does,  or  even 
should,  lead  to  shared  interpretations  and 
understanding.  The  focus  therefore  is  on 
understanding how other relations among individuals 
may influence a semantic relation, which is a relation 
of shared interpretations among people‖ (Monge & 
Contractor, 2003, pg.187) 
One  might  assume  that  increments  in  the  density  of 
communication networks would lead to greater convergence 
in understanding and increases in the density in semantic 
networks,  but  this  may  not  necessarily  be  the  case, 
especially  once  one  begins  to  factor  in  the  psychological 
processes that regulate understanding at the individual level. 
To date, very few studies have examined how changes in 
one type of network influence the dynamic structural profile 
of  semantic  networks.  In  one  study,  however,  Contractor 
and Grant (1996) examined the effect of social contagion in 
communication  and  semantic  networks  using  a  computer 
simulation  approach.  They  found  that  the  latency  for 
semantic convergence (i.e., the time required to develop a 
common  interpretation  or  shared  understanding)  was 
positively related to the initial density of the communication 
and  semantic  networks,  inversely  related  to  the 
heterogeneity of the communication network, and inversely 
related  to  the  individual‘s  resistance  to  social  influence. 
Studies such as this provide an interesting starting point for 
further  simulations  that  aim  to  examine  the  effect  of 
multiple  networks  (e.g.,  communication  networks)  on  the 
dynamic profile of shared understanding within a particular 
population  (e.g.,  military  coalitions).  Ideally,  such 
simulations  should  aim  to  include  at  least  some  of  the 
factors  that  affect  an  individual‘s  resistance  to  particular 
kinds of knowledge and information, for example, the pre-
existing  level  of  consistency  in  an  individual‘s  belief 
network (see Smart et al., 2010d). Above all, what should 
now  be  clear  is  that  semantic  networks  do  not  merely 
provide  a  representational  format  that  supports  the  easy 
visual identification of particular features associated with a 
community‘s  understanding,  they  also  pave  the  way  for 
applications  and  analyses  that  benefit  from  the  tools, 
techniques  and  concepts  made  available  by  the  emerging 
science  of  networks  (see  Watts,  2003).  By  developing  a 
network-based  articulation  of  shared  understanding,  we 
make  it  amenable  to  various  forms  of  network  scientific 
investigation.  
7.3. Applying Semantic Networks to Military Coalitions 
We  have  already  discussed  a  number  of  ways  in  which 
semantic  networks  might  support  the  analysis  and 
monitoring of shared understanding, and these benefits are 
clearly  applicable  to  military  coalitions.  Thus,  the 
identification of groups of individuals, distinguished on the 
basis  of  shared  understanding,  might  yield  important 
insights into how factors like nationality, training, language, 
attitudes and values contribute to shared understanding (or 
misunderstanding).  Such  groups  also  raise  a  number  of 
interesting questions regarding the way in which coalition 
teams should be formed (for example, should the teams be 
formed  based  on  the  identified  groups?)  and  the  way  in 
which  communication  policies  are  established  (should 
special measures be taken to monitor the communications  
16 
 
taking  place  between  the  members  of  different  groups, 
perhaps  as  a  means  of  dealing  with  the  risk  of 
miscommunication?).  Other  benefits  to  military  coalitions 
include  the  ability  to  monitor  the  effectiveness  of 
interventions designed to enhance shared understanding (an 
effective intervention is thus one that increases the overall 
connectedness of the network and increases the strength of 
network  linkages);  an  ability  to  associate  coalition 
performance  outcomes  with  particular  semantic  network 
configurations  (for  example,  do  certain  types  of  semantic 
network  topology  predict  better  performance  outcomes?); 
and an ability to undertake network science simulations that 
reveal the potential effect of changes in social networks and 
physical  infrastructure  networks  (e.g.,  MANETS)  on  the 
topological  organization  of  semantic  networks  (see 
Contractor & Grant, 1996, for some initial simulation results 
in this area).  
8. FUTURE RESEARCH ON SHARED 
UNDERSTANDING IN MILITARY COALITIONS 
Future  research  into  shared  understanding  in  military 
coalition  contexts  could  assume  a  variety  of  forms.  As 
discussed in Section 5.2, there are a wide variety of issues 
and challenges for those engaged in shared understanding 
research, and these could all serve as  the  focus of  future 
research  efforts.  One  of  the  issues  that  is  of  perhaps  the 
greatest  interest  at  the  present  time  concerns  our 
understanding  of  the  factors  that  influence  shared 
understanding in military coalitions. In particular, we need 
to  understand  what  features  of  the  military  coalition 
communication  environment  support  the  emergence  of 
shared  understanding  and  what  factors  undermine  shared 
understanding  once  it  is  established.  This  is,  in  fact,  the 
focus of one of the research components of the ITA research 
program.  The  following  discussion  describes,  in  broad 
outline, the nature of the work to be undertaken in the 2011-
2013 timeframe. 
One way in which we might develop a better understanding 
of  the  factors  affecting  shared  understanding  in  military 
coalition environments is to develop a computational model 
of  military  coalitions  and  then  systematically  manipulate 
model  parameters  in  order  to  understand  how  these 
parameters affect variables related to shared understanding. 
This simulation-based approach has a number of advantages 
compared to real-world empirical studies. For example, it 
avoids  the  cost  (or  risk)  of  running  large-scale  coalition-
based  experiments,  and  it  also  enables  the  research 
community  to  explore  ‗what-if‘  scenarios  involving  the 
systematic manipulation of variables that would simply be 
too impractical (or dangerous) to manipulate in real-world 
contexts
11. Despite the advantages, however, there are  a 
                                                            
11 This is not to say that real-world studies should not be undertaken. 
The  role  of  multi-agent  simulation  work  should  be  twofold:  firstly,  to 
verify  the  results  of  real-world  studies  and  to  determine  the  precise 
conditions under which the results hold; secondly, to inform, guide and 
inspire the direction of future empirical research. In particular, multi-agent 
simulations  play  an  important  role  in  the  development  of  theoretical 
number of issues and concerns associated with the use of 
simulation  studies.  Notwithstanding  the  difficulty  of 
modelling and measuring shared understanding in silico, we 
also have to confront the complexity of the modern military 
communication  environment.  To  make  the  results  of 
simulation studies relevant to military coalition operations, 
we have to ensure that we adequately identify and represent 
those features of the military communication environment 
that might affect shared understanding.  
The  proposed  approach  to  addressing  these  challenges  is 
twofold.  Firstly,  as  regards  the  modelling  of  coalition 
communication environments, we can readily identify a set 
of  features  that  could  serve  as  the  initial  targets  of 
simulation-based  research.  These  features  include  the 
following: 
1)  Variable,  time-variant  inter-agent  trust  relationships 
(particularly trust relationships that change as a result of 
previous interaction or experience). 
2)  Variable certainty in information received from external 
sources (e.g., variable certainty assigned to information 
from particular sensors). 
3)  Variable confidence or certainty in one‘s own beliefs 
and that of other agents
12. 
4)  Group-specific  differences  in  communication  network 
structure. 
5)  Partial and restricted views of relevant environmental 
information (e.g., different agents have different levels 
of  access  to  particular  sensor  feeds  or  information 
sources). 
6)  Information sharing policies (some information may be 
shared  among  the  coalition,  while  other  information 
may  have  limited  distribution  due  to  security 
constraints
13).  
7)  Ambiguous, conflicting and uncertain information.  
8)  Differences in background knowledge and beliefs (e.g., 
cultural differences). 
9)  Linguistic differences (these may, on occasion, result in 
the misinterpretation of communicated information (see 
Poteet et al., 2008)). 
In terms of the second challenge – modelling and measuring 
shared  understanding  –  we  propose  to  use  a  multi-agent 
simulation  technique  in  which  the  extent  of  shared 
understanding  will be indicated by commonality of belief 
states across multiple (synthetic) agents. The beliefs of each 
agent, in this case, will reflect their interpretation of some 
                                                                                                  
predictions and testable hypothesis that can then be evaluated in the context 
of real-world empirical studies. 
12 Previous research has identified confidence in one‘s own beliefs to be 
a  key  factor  in  some  cases  of  collective  cognitive  processing  (Kuhn  & 
Sniezek, 1996; Van Swol & Sniezek, 2002).  
13 This profile of information sharing may be the result of the kind of 
errors  and  biases  seen  i n  group-based  research  (e.g.  the  common 
knowledge effect; Stasser & Titus, 1985).  
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external source of information, and they will be permitted to 
communicate their interpretations to other agents based on 
the constraints imposed by the (simulated) communication 
network. In developing this simulation capability, we aim to 
draw  on  previous  work  in  the  multi-agent  simulation 
community; however, not all previous work in this area is 
necessarily relevant to our research goals. In particular, a 
review of multi-agent simulation work reveals a number of 
shortcomings relative to the demands of the current project. 
These  include  (but  are  necessarily  not  limited  to)  the 
following: 
  Psychological  Realism.  As  described  by  Smart  et  al 
(2010c),  any  simulation  study  should  include  a 
judicious mix of psychological realism and real-world 
simplification, but the problem with many multi-agent 
simulations  is  that  the  agents  are  too  rigid  and 
simplistic  to  be  even  approximate  simulacra  of  their 
real-world  human  counterparts.  In  many  cases,  the 
agents  are  simply  represented  by  single,  time-variant 
numerical  values,  and  they  lack  any  kind  of  internal 
cognitive  processing  capability.  This  is  a  crucial 
limitation, and one that  needs to be addressed  in the 
context of future work on collective cognition (see Sun, 
2001). 
  Variable Network Structure. Another shortcoming of 
multi-agent  models  (and  even  social  psychological 
studies)  concerns  the  fact  that  the  communication 
structure  is  often  fixed  throughout  the  course  of 
cognitive  processing.  This  is  a  very  unrealistic 
representation of the social world, and it is also fails to 
adequately  reflect  the  nature  of  military  coalition 
environments (in particular, their use of mobile ad hoc 
communication networks). Furthermore, our own work 
in the ITA program has shown that dynamic networks 
sometimes  have  cognitive  processing  advantages  that 
may  be  absent  in  their  more  statically-configured 
counterparts (Huynh et al., 2010; Smart et al., 2010b; 
Smart et al., 2010d). What this suggests is that further 
research on dynamic networks, specifically in relation 
to  the  variable  nature  of  coalition  communication 
networks,  should  be  an  important  focus  of  future 
research efforts. 
  Group-Level Abstractions. A further concern that is 
inspired  by  a  consideration  of  the  military  coalition 
environment  relates  to  the  absence  of  inter-group 
relationships  in  many  simulation  studies.  The 
interaction between agents  from different  groups is a 
vital  consideration  for  coalition-oriented  research 
because military coalitions consist of multiple groups 
of  individuals  that  can  be  differentiated  in  terms  of 
language, culture, training, expertise, and so on. Despite 
the fact that inter-group factors have been shown to be 
important  for  collective  cognitive  processing
14,  this 
                                                            
14 For example, Mackie and Cooper (1984) found that people‘s attitudes 
were strongly influenced by a member of the same group, but were much 
less affected by an individual who was seen as an outsider. 
aspect of collective cognition has largely been ignored 
by previous simulation efforts.  
Addressing these shortcomings requires the development of 
a  simulation  capability  in  which  1)  the  agents  possess 
cognitive properties that are approximate simulacra of those 
seen  in  human  agents,  2)  the  communication  network 
structure  is  highly  dynamic  and  configurable,  and  3)  the 
behaviour  of  agents  is  subject  to  group-level  influences. 
Meeting  these  requirements  is  a  significant  challenge; 
however,  there  are  a  number  of  existing  models  which 
might  serve  as  a  useful  point  of  departure.  The  extant 
models  all  feature  the  use  of  what  might  be  called  a 
‗network-of-networks‘  approach  to  collective  cognitive 
simulation.  In  all  cases,  the  agents  are  represented  by 
networks  of  representational  and  computational  elements, 
which  are  themselves  connected  together  by  inter-agent 
channels of communication. One such model was proposed 
by  the  cognitive  anthropologist  Edwin  Hutchins  (1991). 
Hutchins (1991) used a  network of constraint  satisfaction 
networks to model the way in which a collection of agents 
responded  to  ambiguous  environmental  information.  He 
showed that when agents are allowed to share information 
from the outset of the simulation they rapidly converge on a 
particular  (sometimes  inaccurate)  interpretation  of 
environmental information, and they subsequently discount 
competing interpretations. Hutchins (1991) thus developed a 
compelling  model  of  group-level  confirmation  bias  and 
showed that under certain circumstances it can be even more 
extreme  than  individual  forms  of  confirmation  bias.  A 
second model is the ‗Talking Nets‘ model of Van Overwalle 
and Heylighen (2006). The interesting feature of this model 
is that it explicitly includes a representation of inter-agent 
trust (referred to as ‗cognitive trust‘), and it shows how a 
dynamic profile of inter-agent trust relationships contributes 
to the emergence of a number of notable collective cognitive 
phenomena. Finally, our own research in the ITA has led to 
a multi-level model for socially-mediated cognitive change 
(Smart et al., 2010c; Smart et al., 2010d). The specific value 
of this model is that it incorporates group-level abstractions, 
which  (in  the  current  version  of  the  model)  roughly 
correspond  to  distinct  cultures.  The  model  therefore 
provides a means by which collective cognitive processes 
can  be  examined  in  complex  multi-group  (multi-cultural) 
situations, similar to those encountered in military coalition 
contexts. 
Once a simulation capability is available, it will be used to 
study  the  effect  of  a  number  of  variables  on  collective 
cognition. The specific questions  we intend to address  as 
part of this research include the following: 
1)  How  does  the  topological  structure  of  the 
communication network affect the ability of a group of 
agents  to  form  an  accurate  interpretation  of 
ambiguous/conflicting  sensor  information?  How  do 
inter-group  differences  in  communication  network 
topology  (e.g.,  high  intra-group  connectivity  and  low 




2)  What effect does inter-agent trust have on the ability of 
a coalition to converge on an accurate interpretation of 
ambiguous information? If we assume that intra-group 
trust  relationships  (e.g.,  between  individuals  of  the 
same  nationality)  are  stronger  (at  least  initially)  than 
inter-group  ones,  what  impact  does  this  have  on  the 
potential for accurate convergence? 
3)  How  do  cultural  differences  in  agents‘  pre-existing 
belief  structures  affect  the  dynamics  of  cognitive 
convergence and divergence (this issue is discussed at 
length in Smart et al (2010d) and Smart et al (2010c)). 
4)  What effect does partial information sharing  have on 
cognitive convergence? If some information is shared 
and  the  rest  is  not,  what  impact  does  this  have  on 
collective interpretation capabilities? Previous research 
suggests that the shared information will bias decision 
outcomes  at  the  expense  of  non-shared  information 
(Stasser & Titus, 1985), but can this bias be attenuated 
if  information  sharing  is  restricted  to  specific  sub-
groups? 
5)  What  effect  does  differential  exposure  to  ambiguous 
sensor information have on cognitive convergence? Is it 
better for ambiguous sensor information to be diffusely 
spread across a community of agents, or does it help if 
sensor information is restricted to particular sub-groups 
of agents?  
The result of running simulations to answer these questions 
will be an improved understanding of how (some) features 
of the military coalition environment (for example, group 
differences in communication network structure) affect the 
formation  of  a  common  coalition-wide  interpretation  (or 
shared  understanding)  of  ambiguous,  uncertain  or 
conflicting situations
15. Inasmuch, as we are able to equate 
the  notions  of  dynamic  situational  understanding  and 
situation awareness (see Section  4.2), it may be that these 
results  also  shed  light  on  the  factors  that  affect  the 
emergence of SSA in military coalition contexts.  
9. CONCLUSION 
The  primary  aim  of  this  paper  has  been  to  improve  our 
understanding  of  both  individual  and  shared  forms  of 
understanding. Such an improvement is important given the 
perceived significance of shared understanding to coalition 
operations and the current focus of ongoing research efforts 
into  coalition  capabilities  (shared  understanding  has,  for 
example, been recognized as a major research challenge in 
the context of the ITA research program). Unfortunately, the 
notion  of  understanding  is  something  that  has  proved 
notoriously difficult to understand, and this is the source of 
considerable  confusion  in  both  the  philosophical  and 
scientific literatures.  
                                                            
15 The representational and visualization techniques discussed in Section 
7 and Smart et al (2010e) provide a potential means by which the dynamics 
of  cognitive  convergence  in  the  synthetic  agent  community  might  be 
analyzed and understood. 
In spite of the definitional difficulties, we have seen that the 
expression of behaviours that manifest at least some kinds 
of  understanding  (e.g.  situational  understanding  and  the 
understanding of intentional actions) do seem to have some 
common  features.  These  include  an  ability  to  make 
inferences  about  the  unseen  and  perhaps  forever 
unobservable. In essence, what we encounter in many cases 
of understanding is an ability to ‗see more than meets the 
eye‘.  Often  these  inferences  give  a  predictive  and 
explanatory grasp on the thing that is to be understood, and 
they often enable us to express thoughts and actions that are 
suited to the realization of diverse goals. Although we do 
not  agree  with  Føllesdal  (1981)  that  understanding  is  a 
particular form of knowledge, it is true that, in many cases, 
understanding is evidenced by the expression of a flexible 
performance  ability,  and  this  ability  seems  to  rest  on  the 
exploitation of particular bodies of knowledge. Perhaps if 
we were to attempt to capture the essence of understanding 
it  would  be  this  ability  to  use  our  knowledge  in  highly 
flexible,  adaptive  and  context-sensitive  ways  that  would 
most occupy our attention. Understanding often seems to be 
ascribed  when  people  are  able  to  use  their  knowledge  to 
solve particular problems – the performances that manifest 
understanding are often cases of, what we might refer to as, 
‗knowledge in use‘.  
The characterization of understanding as akin to an ability 
sheds light on what it means to have shared understanding. 
Shared understanding, we have suggested, implies similarity 
of  understanding  with  respect  to  particular  things,  for 
example, goals, tasks, and situations. In the case of coalition 
operations,  the  abilities  that  are  likely  to  emerge  as 
important are those related to the formation of expectations 
and  predictions  regarding  future  actions,  events  and 
information requirements. Shared understanding is therefore 
likely to be important in coalition contexts for a variety of 
reasons. For example, it may enable coalition members to 
anticipate  one  another‘s  information  requirements  and 
thereby  optimize  the  distribution  of  information  within  a 
network environment (i.e., it may enable information to be 
sent to the right place at the right time). Inasmuch as shared 
understanding  contributes  to  the  deployment  of  efficient 
modes  of  inter-agent  communication  and  coordination,  it 
may  have  particular  value  in  the  context  of  coalition 
operations. This is because coalition environments are often 
resource  constrained  environments  in  which  power 
overheads and network traffic must be kept to a minimum. 
If  shared  understanding  improves  the  efficiency  of  inter-
agent  communication  (perhaps  reducing  the  need  for 
communication  altogether),  it  may  optimize  the  use  of 
limited network assets. 
We have seen that there are a number of important areas for 
future research on shared understanding. One of these areas 
is  a  theoretical  undertaking:  an  attempt  to  identify  the 
precise  relationships  between  shared  understanding  and 
other  human  factors  constructs,  such  as  shared  situation 
awareness,  shared  mental  models  and  team  sensemaking. 
Another focus of research attention concerns techniques and  
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methods to measure shared understanding. Finally, we need 
to develop a better understanding of the factors that affect 
shared understanding in military coalition environments. In 
particular, we need to understand how specific features of 
the military coalition communication environment affect the 
emergence,  maintenance  and  disruption  of  shared 
understanding  between  culturally-  and  linguistically-
disparate  groups.  Research  in  the  next  phase  of  the  ITA 
program will attempt to shed light on precisely this issue. 
The  work  will  attempt  to  identify  and  model  particular 
features  of  the  coalition  communication  environment  that 
affect  shared  understanding.  It  will  then  use  multi-agent 
simulation techniques to explore the effect of those features 
on the emergence of shared understanding in synthetic agent 
communities. The outcome of this research will be a better 
understanding of how at least some features of the coalition 
communication  environment  affect  understanding.  It  will 
also begin to shed light on how future technologies might be 
used to regulate shared understanding in ways that enable 
military coalition organizations to adaptively coordinate (or 
synchronize)  their  collective  behaviours  in  support  of 
common mission objectives.   
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